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Background 
 
In May 2003, the European Commission sent a Communication to 
Council and the European Parliament entitled Reinvigorating EU 
Actions on Human Rights and Democratisation with 
Mediterranean Partners: Strategic Guidelines.
1 The 
communication makes ten solid proposals on improving the 
dialogue between the European Union and its Mediterranean 
partners on human rights and democratisation (see Annex 1). 
Nothing short of “main streaming” of human rights in the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) is being proposed. Ample 
justification is made by the Commission for this policy line by 
reference to that of the EU’s own policies, the declarations within 
the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and to the 
UNDP’s Arab Human Development Report for 2002 highlighting 
the “freedom deficit” in the Arab world as one of the causes of the 
region’s backwardness. This paper focuses on the link between 
democracy and development and between democracy and 
international peace or the “democratic peace” argument. Thus, one 
part of the analysis surveys the possible link between democracy 
and development while the other delves into the connection 
between democracy and regional peace and stability. 
 
Human rights, economic prosperity and social progress are the 
main declared aims of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership seeking 
to achieve a Euro-Mediterranean ‘security community’ covering 
both the military and non-military aspects of security (for a 
summary of the EMP and Human Rights see Annex 2). The 
Commission’s renewed and increased emphasis on human rights is 
therefore in keeping with the spirit of the EMP as well as with the 
EU’s own, long-standing endeavours at promoting human rights in 
                                         
1 Com (2003) 294 final, Brussels 21.05.2003 
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international relations - not to mention the importance accorded to 
them by the EU as witnessed by their introduction in the draft 
European constitution currently under discussion. For reasons 
discussed below, not only does the latest Commission initiative fit 
both the political and economic agenda of the EMP but since all the 
states of the region have accepted the Universal Declaration of 
human rights and most of them have also endorsed successive 
declarations on human rights, this policy line ought not in theory to 
raise any difficulties for them.  
 
Of course this is not true. An enormous gulf still separates rhetoric 
and reality on human rights and democratic freedom at both the 
international and regional levels. For these reasons, the 
ramifications of the Commission’s latest foreign policy initiative 
may have repercussions that go deeper than at first strikes the eye, 
particularly if the causal links indicated here, between democracy 
and development and between democracy and peace are real. If 
they are not, then the policy is just a narrow cul-de-sac. The 
Commission’s proposals are also likely to encounter opposition 
from ruling elites in the southern Mediterranean countries keen on 
defending their privileges and by some member state governments 
who will put ‘national’ or unilateral interests above human rights. 
 
However, if indeed the pursuance of human rights and democratic 
freedoms leads to more regional security while laying the ground 
for increased economic growth and prosperity, then the 
Commission’s proposal ought to be vigorously pursued. In dealing 
with the problem posed here, there are two ways in which the 
causal links between democracy, human rights and development 
can be analysed. One can take the empirical route and prove the 
case by reference to the datum of experience. Reference, though 
not exhaustive, to this kind of approach in the literature is made 
here. Or one can simply take as a point of departure the fact that 
states have formally accepted their interconnectedness and 
importance, in which case the question then becomes one of 
measuring whether in practice they hold this 
interconnectedness/importance to be significant and indispensable 
or whether they disregard it.  
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There are numerous declarations in which states have not only 
concurred with the proposal that human rights and democratic 
freedoms should be strengthened but that democracy and 
fundamental freedoms are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. 
This was eloquently stated in the 1993 Vienna Declaration adopted 
at the end of the World Conference on Human Rights:  
  
"Democracy, development and the respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms are interdependent 
and mutually reinforcing. Democracy is based on the 
freely expressed will of the people to determine their 
own political, economic, social and cultural systems 
and their full participation in all aspects of their lives. 
In the context of the above, the promotion and 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
at the national and international levels should be 
universal and conducted without conditions attached. 
The international community should support the 
strengthening and promoting of democracy, 
development and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in the entire world."
2
 
But as evidenced by existing realities, such a holistic approach to 
political and economic development has not as yet become 
ingrained in the Mediterranean region, particularly in its southern 
shore countries. Governments seem to have been finally converted, 
following protracted resistance, to the principles of the market 
economy, but are not keen on relinquishing political control, which 
strengthening democracy and human rights implies. One of the 
justifications often cited for this ambivalence is that democracy, as 
demonstrated by the case of Algeria, could deliver political power 
to its own grave diggers. Politics based on kinship and clientelism 
also mean that the market economy philosophy does not always go 
down well with governing elites. Hence, mirroring what happens at 
the international level, rhetoric still characterises the regional 
debate on democracy and human rights as exemplified by the many 
                                         
2 UN General Assembly, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 14-25 
June 1993, A/CONF.157/23, point 8.  
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declarations to which states readily subscribe, without however 
implementing them.  
 
Moreover, as a result of the so called war against terrorism, some 
reversals on the human rights-democracy front have also become 
evident. It was exactly one year before the September 11 2001 
attack on the World Trade Centre that the nations of the world 
subscribed to the 'solemn' Millennium Declaration. In the 
Declaration, the world community through its representatives in the 
General Assembly of the United Nations had pledged "to spare no 
effort to promote democracy and the rule of law, as well as respect 
for all internationally recognised human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, including the right to development."
3 Reporting on the 
progress made towards achieving the goals of the Declaration over 
the past three years, the UN Secretary General claims that there is a 
danger that the world may retreat from some of the important gains 
made during the 1990s, as human rights come under pressure both 
from terrorism and from the methods used by States to fight it. This 
problem can be further illustrated by numerous examples from the 
Mediterranean region as for example happened in Morocco 
following the Casablanca bombing. Hence not only is there a 
rhetoric versus reality gap but there are also clear signs that the 
development and enhancement of democracy and the observance of 
human rights is not a linear progression which once initiated 
becomes irresistible, unstoppable and irreversible.  
  
In this discussion reference is made to human rights and 
democracy. The two are not synonymous, nor should they be 
conflated. Democracy is the political, legal and institutional 
framework within which human rights and freedoms can be 
attained and sustained. The more scrupulously they are observed 
and upheld, the more robust and resilient do the institutions of 
democracy become. Democracy is the condition for the enjoyment 
of fundamental rights in their fullness. There can be no democracy 
without human rights, while the latter will be weakened or their 
                                         
3 United Nations Millennium Declaration, Resolution adopted by the UN 
General Assembly, September 18, 2000, chapter V, points 24 and 25, 
A/RES/55/2 
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existence made tenuous should democracy be undermined. It is 
difficult to envisage democracy without human rights or vice versa. 
The market economy is a characteristic of a democratic polity, 
though one may envisage a democracy with strong state 
intervention costly as this may be. On their own, market forces will 
not however deliver a democratic polity. 
 
Finally, although there may be a lot of advantage for all the 
countries of the Mediterranean region in pursuing policies aiming 
to strengthen democracy and human rights, it must be kept in mind 
that these policies alone will not resolve all security challenges 
emanating in the region. In other words, although the advance of 
democracy may lead to the diminution of mutual suspicions across 
the region, which may in turn convince governments to lay less 
emphasis on developing military systems and weapons 
programmes, non-peaceful or coercive methods will certainly 
continue to be required even at reduced levels, to counter such 
threats as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and classical military challenges. Indeed, it has to be 
kept in mind that the security problematique has changed 
dramatically since the end of the cold war from an excessive 
preoccupation with the nuclear balance to other serious worries 
such as weapons proliferation, terrorism, and lest we overlook its 
importance, the threat posed by environmental degradation. Hence 
a measure of realist prudence or caution is also required in 
confronting the challenges of the Mediterranean region without 
however allowing such prudence and caution to regress into an 
exclusive reliance on military means alone. Democratic control 
must be strengthened in order to prevent this. Furthermore, care 
must be taken to ensure that measures to combat terrorism and 
proliferation were not allowed to undermine the foundations of 
democracy or the progress on democratic reforms achieved so far. 
 
Democracies and War-Proneness 
 
A widely held view in international relations theory, dating back to 
the classical liberals, holds that democratic countries are less likely 
to go to war. This belief is based on what has become famously 
known as the “Kantian democratic peace” theory. This section 
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summarises the main thrusts of this theory. The theories of 
democratic peace originate in Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace: A 
Philosophical Sketch (1795)
4,  in which the German philosopher 
articulated the main conditions for the attainment of universal 
peace, namely that individuals embrace freedom, that the civil 
constitution of every state is republican, i.e. based on the rule of the 
people, that such republican states conclude a federal pact between 
them and that the people of the world would have achieved a 
universal community where the violation of one right in any part of 
the world is felt everywhere. Classical liberals argued that 
democratic freedoms, international trade, freedom of the seas and 
increased inter-dependencies lead to international stability. 
President Woodrow Wilson’s famous Fourteen Points epitomise 
this philosophy. David Mitrany’s ‘functionalist’ approach as 
articulated in his essay, A Working Peace System (1943)
5, 
highlights the hypothesis that growing interdependencies and 
transnational collaboration and integration to regulate and manage 
various global activities of a ‘functional’ nature not only contribute 
towards the general, universal welfare, but they also make nation-
states increasingly inadequate as units of political and social 
organisation in confronting these challenges of the modern world. 
Integration by means of functional co-operation in turn also 
transforms the international system from one based on inter-state 
rivalry to one founded on more intense though regulated 
collaboration which leads to peace.  
 
The post-war international organisations mainly established on 
America’s insistence, such as the United Nations (UN), the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), now the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), amongst others, (some of which are unfortunately being 
undermined by a transient US Republican administration) were all 
creatures of this liberal-functionalist vision. The notion of a 
                                         
4 Reiss Hans (ed), Kant: Political Writings, Cambridge Texts in the History of 
Political Thought, Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp 93-130; 
5 Mitrany David, A Working Peace System, in Nelsen B. F. and Stubb A. C-G 
(eds.), The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European 
Integration, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994, pp 77-97. 
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“security community”, another landmark development in theory 
building of the post second world war is also worth highlighting. 
Elaborated in 1957 by Karl W. Deutsch, the “security community” 
was defined as a group of people who have become “integrated” 
within a territory to the point that they have attained a “sense of 
community” characterised by a belief that common social problems 
can be resolved by processes of dependable peaceful change, 
normally through institutionalised procedures without the need to 
resort to large-scale physical force. Thus according to Deutsch, if 
the entire world were to be integrated into a single security 
community, war would be eliminated.
6 Although Deutsch’s notion 
of a security community referred to both ‘national’ and 
‘international’ ones, the impact of this theory was felt more 
intensely in the international or regional integration spheres. The 
theory’s intellectual links with Kant, the Classical Liberals and 
Mitrany are also obvious as are its links with the principles on 
which the European Union itself is founded. Moreover, the EU 
believes that what works for Europe can also work in other regions 
of the world and hence that its political and economic model is 
exportable as an instrument for dealing with many of the world’s 
problems.  
 
A 1964 article by Dean V. Babst can be taken as a ‘symbolic’ 
turning point in the thrust of liberal literature on the subject, when 
the analysis begins to focus more sharply on the causal link 
between democracy and peace by reference to empirical data. 
Babst, focusing on Quincy Wright’s 1942, A Study of War 
suggested that “the existence of independent nations with elective 
governments greatly increases the chances of the maintenance of 
peace.”
7 The rich and varied array of studies of the same genre 
which followed this article included amongst others the numerous 
contributions by Michael Doyle, Bruce Russett as well as others 
such as Melvin Small, J. David Singer, James Lee Ray, and R. J. 
                                         
6 Deutsch Karl W. et. Al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: 
International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience, Princeton 
University Press, 1957. 
7 Babst Dean V., “Elective Governments - A Force for Peace”, The Wisconsin 
Sociologist, Vol.3, 1, 1964, pp 9-14. 
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Rummel. Doyle argued on the basis of empirical evidence that 
democratic governance, a commitment to human rights and 
transnational interdependence explain the peace bias of 
democracies.
8 Disputes between democratic states, by no means a 
rarity as amply demonstrated by transatlantic relations or by the 
frequency of intra-EU disagreements, are not allowed to escalate to 
the point of issuing threats to resort to military force, let alone to 
actually using force, because democratic states, which are used to 
resolving domestic conflicts peacefully, employ mediation and 
negotiation through bilateral or multilateral diplomatic channels to 
try to resolve international disputes. It can be added that this kind 
of behaviour is facilitated by the establishment of international 
institutions and dispute-settlement mechanisms such as those found 
within the WTO. Indeed, in 1993, Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett 
found compelling evidence to show that to the extent possible, 
states try to externalise the norms of behaviour that are developed 
within them and which characterise their domestic political 
processes and institutions. It follows that when two democracies 
confront one another in conflicts of interest, they are able to 
effectively apply democratic norms in their interaction but when 
the clash is between a democratic and a non-democratic state, the 
former may be forced into adopting the non-democratic norms of 
the other. Maoz and Russett conclude that the complete absence of 
war between democracies is not a spurious correlation, that regime 
type has a consistent dampening effect on international conflict and 
that both political constraints and democratic norms provide 
reasonably good explanations of why democracies rarely fight each 
other.
9  
 
Another important aspect of the democratic peace theory concerns 
the link between free trade and economic interdependence. This 
                                         
8 Doyle Michael, “On the Democratic Peace”, International Security, Vol 19, No 
4, 1995, pp 164-84. 
9 Maoz Zeev and Russett Bruce, “Normative and Structural Causes of 
Democratic Peace, 1946-86”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No 3, 
1993, pp 624-638. 
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aspect was analysed by Russett and John R. Oneal.
10 The basic 
assumption in this case is that ceteris paribus, in a dyadic 
relationship, trade gives one party a stake in the economic well-
being of the other and conflict is thus avoided because the states 
concerned have something to lose as a result of the disruption of 
trade by war. In other words, economic interdependence increases 
the costs of waging war. Russett and Oneal concluded that higher 
levels of economically important trade as indicated by bilateral 
trade to GDP ratios are associated with lower incidences of 
militarised interstate disputes and conflicts. Economic openness is 
also inversely associated with dyadic conflict. But this observation 
need not be limited to pairs of countries: “as countries become 
increasingly open to external economic relations, they become 
more constrained from resorting to the use of force, even against a 
rival with whom commercial ties are limited. It is the world’s 
outcasts, then, that represent the greatest danger to peaceful 
international relations.”
11
 
Although the findings in favour of the ‘democratic peace’ thesis are 
quite numerous and strong, some scholars stress a number of other 
factors that may also have an explanatory value as to why peace is 
maintained and which directly challenge the ‘democratic peace’ 
theory. Realism with its focus on the effects of alliance on 
maintaining stability among allies and the balance of power 
between adversaries, the effects of the asymmetry of military and 
economic power, physical distance or proximity and deterrence, 
remains a potent adversary of ‘democratic peace’ theory. Thus 
realist approaches led to questions being raised as to whether it is 
democracy as such which explains the peace that has reigned 
among democratic countries, during what many realists claim to be 
certain well defined periods or whether it is the identity of national 
governing regimes with shared world visions that has discouraged 
states from going to war against one another. Questions are thus 
raised as to which is really the explanatory variable of periods of 
                                         
10 Oneal John R. and Russett Bruce, “The Classical Liberals were Right: 
Democracy, Interdependence and Conflict”, International Studies Quarterly, 
Vol: 41, 2, 1997, pp 267-293 
11 ibid., page 281. 
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peace, democracy or the other factors such as the balance of power. 
It was from such an angle that Raymond Cohen criticised the 
theory on the grounds that the statistical correlation between 
democracy and peaceful behaviour was much more restricted than 
claimed and that the causal link between democracy and peace held 
only for the North-Atlantic area. He makes a further pointed 
observation that South America exhibited many of the features of a 
Kantian peace despite the fact that many of the states of the region 
are not democracies.
12 Cohen’s criticism has been rejected by 
Russett and Ray, adding that in their democratic phase, the 
countries of Latin America have shown a stronger propensity 
towards resolving conflicts peacefully.
13  
 
Despite the criticism levelled against it, ‘democratic peace’ theory 
still has a lot of importance if only because its central thesis, that 
democratic countries are less likely to go to war, cannot easily be 
refuted statistically. Democracies are always preferable to other 
forms of governance judged from the perspective of development 
and the position of individuals within them. As has been 
demonstrated by historic experience, governments in a democracy 
find it harder to start a war because they are accountable to their 
publics. The force of public opinion is still one that democracies 
have to reckon with before deciding to go to war making them 
more constrained (though not always restrained) than authoritarian 
governments. The Anglo-American occupation of Iraq and the 
removal of Saddam Hussein illustrates the point. Although 
overwhelming public opposition to the war did not stop President 
Bush and Premier Blair from going to war, both face strong public 
disapproval, which may also mean that both politicians may not be 
re-elected. Meanwhile, in justifying their actions both politicians 
speak less of the war having been warranted by the need to 
eliminate weapons of mass destruction (for obvious reasons) and 
                                         
12 Cohen, Raymond, “Pacific Unions: A Reappraisal of the theory that 
democracies do not go to war with each other”, Review of International Studies, 
Vol.20, 3, July 1994, pp 207-223. 
13 Russett, Bruce and Ray, James Lee, “Raymond Cohen on Pacific Unions: A 
Response and a Reply”, Review of International Studies, Vol.21, 3, July 1995, pp 
319-323. 
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more about replacing tyranny by democratic governance in Iraq, a 
theme that was present from early statements made prior to the war. 
 
Policy Implications 
 
Leaving the theoretical debate aside for the moment, the policy 
implications flowing from the logic of  “democratic peace” seem to 
have been adopted by major democratic governments. This can be 
demonstrated by reference to the central importance accorded to it 
in the USA’s and EU’s foreign policy rhetoric or by the importance 
given to it by international economic organisations (IMF, OECD, 
World Bank) who increasingly insist upon the need for “good 
governance” as a proxy for insisting on “democracy”. From the 
many public policy statements that make reference to “democratic 
peace”, this extract from President Clinton’s 1994 “State of the 
Union” speech is an exemplary one: 
 
“Ultimately, the best strategy to ensure our security and 
to build a durable peace is to support the advance of 
democracy elsewhere. Democracies don't attack each 
other, they make better trading partners and partners in 
diplomacy. That is why we have supported, you and I, 
the democratic reformers in Russia and in the other 
states of the former Soviet bloc. I applaud the bipartisan 
support this Congress provided last year for our 
initiatives to help Russia, Ukraine, and the other states 
through their epic transformations.” 
14
 
It is a line that has not been disowned by the current Republican 
administration. On the web-site of the US Department of State, the 
protection of human rights is described as being in the “national 
interest” and one reads that: 
 
“The United States understands that the existence of 
human rights helps secure the peace, deter aggression, 
promote the rule of law, combat crime and corruption, 
                                         
14 President William Jefferson Clinton, State of the Union speech, 1994. 
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strengthens democracies and prevents humanitarian 
crises…”
15
 
For the EU, human rights, democracy and development go 
together. In June 1991, the European Council meeting in 
Luxembourg stated quite clearly that the Union perceives human 
rights as being indivisible, in other words one set of rights, say 
economic rights, are not prior in importance to the others. Also, 
that they are not separable from democracy and that they lay the 
foundations for a holistic social and economic development centred 
upon the individual. 
 
“The European Council recalls the indivisible character 
of human rights. The promotion of economic, social 
and cultural rights, as of civil and political rights, and of 
respect for religious freedom and freedom of worship, 
is of fundamental importance for the full realisation of 
human dignity and of legitimate aspirations of every 
individual. Democracy, pluralism, respect for human 
rights, institutions working in a constitutional 
framework and responsible governments appointed 
following periodic, fair elections as well as the 
recognition of the legitimate importance of the 
individual in a society are essential prerequisites of 
sustained social and economic development.”
16
 
The EU Commission states that the Union is “committed to the 
promotion of democracy, good governance and the rule of law as 
well as the protection of all Human Rights, civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural.”
17 In the sphere of external relations, 
the EU seeks to mainstream Human Rights and democratisation 
into its polices and actions. Human rights and democracy clauses 
have been included in Association Agreements signed with third 
countries since 1991. However, there is still a marked reluctance by 
                                         
15 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/hr  
16 Conclusions of the Presidency, Annex V, Declaration on Human Rights, 
Luxembourg, 28-29 June, 1991.  
17 Ibid., Com (2003) 294 final 
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the EU to severely punish offenders thus causing concern about the 
priority that human rights are actually given by the EU vis-à-vis 
other competing demands. A rhetoric-reality gap is evident in the 
EU on this score. 
 
In so far as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is concerned, there 
is no doubt that the Barcelona Declaration of November 1995, 
which initiated the process, is underpinned by democracy, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms (see Annex 2), a policy later 
reaffirmed by the EU in its Common Strategy towards the 
Mediterranean adopted by the European Council meeting in Santa 
Maria da Feira in June 2000
18 as well as by the numerous 
declarations adopted by the Euro-Mediterranean foreign ministers 
at the end of their periodic meetings. The Commission’s 
Communications to prepare for the 4
th and 5
th Euro-Mediterranean 
Conferences of Ministers in Marseilles (15-16 November 2000) 
and Valencia (22-23 April 2002), as well as the recent 
communication on “Wider Europe”
19, call for greater prominence 
to be given to Human Rights, democracy, good governance and the 
rule of law in the EU’s relations with its Mediterranean partners, 
and made a number of concrete proposals to this end. These 
covered in particular systematic discussion of Human Rights and 
democracy in all contacts between the EU and the partners with a 
view to promoting a structural approach to progress; closer linkage 
of MEDA allocations to progress in these fields; setting up joint 
working groups of officials between the EU and the partners; 
encouraging the signature, ratification and implementation of 
relevant international instruments; and recognition of the role of 
civil society. In the Action Plan resulting from the Valencia 
conference Ministers reiterated their firm political commitment to 
democracy, Human Rights and rule of law in the region and agreed, 
under the political and security chapter, to reinforce political 
dialogue. They asked Senior Officials to study setting up a more 
structured dialogue in order to increase effectiveness. 
 
                                         
18 OJ L 183 of 22
nd July 2000. 
19 Com (2003) 104 final, Brussels 11.3.2003. 
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For the southern rim countries of the Mediterranean region it is 
important to note that this policy line is unlikely to change in the 
near future. European and Western public opinion is also likely to 
continue to sustain this line. Hence, the EU’s Mediterranean 
partners must rest assured that this topic will frequently recur in 
their dealings with the EU, implying that they have to really factor 
it into both their domestic as well as external policies. The end of 
the cold war has, rightly or wrongly, strengthened, not weakened, 
the USA’s and Europe’s ability to stress more strongly this policy 
line. Hence pragmatism constrains the EU’s Mediterranean partners 
to cease considering this issue as one in which a “no war, no peace” 
could last for ever.  
 
Democracy and Development 
 
Development comprises more than just economic growth, 
notwithstanding that the latter is a key element of the former. In 
addition to economic growth, development also requires increased 
enjoyment of other non-economic goods such as education and 
health services as well as rights such as freedom. Hence, economic 
growth by itself is not a sign of real progress unless accompanied 
by a fairer distribution of wealth and welfare. As Amartya Sen 
argues, economic growth by itself is not a complete and exhaustive 
manner in which to measure the success or otherwise of 
democracy. But does democracy enhance the rate of development? 
The answer is important in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership: if the reply is in the affirmative then there are 
sufficiently good reasons why the Union should insist more 
strongly on the promotion of human rights and democratic 
freedom. A second and related question could be: How is the 
political aspect of democracy (discussed in the previous section) 
related to the economic one? 
 
Classical liberals and the philosophers of the Enlightenment have 
long honed in on the negative implications of war and its material 
and economic costs. War avoidance is logically welfare enhancing, 
all other things being equal, because it prevents the unnecessary 
destruction of human beings and material assets allowing more 
wealth for distribution, assuming of course the existence of 
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efficient distributive institutions to achieve this. As John Stuart 
Mill argued, increased wealth also permits society to cultivate other 
human needs such as the arts.  
 
The parameters of a discussion on democracy and development 
have been summarised by Georg Sorensen very succinctly.
20 The 
first argument in Sorensen’s appraisal concerns the oft repeated 
criticism that democratic governance cannot guarantee sufficient 
order in society to permit brisk economic growth and that since the 
odds are increasingly stacked against the successful promotion of 
development, which requires ever higher levels of state 
intervention, then authoritarian governments are more suited to 
promote economic development than democracies. This is what 
Sen, quoted in the concluding section of this paper, refers to as “the 
Lee Hypothesis”. Furthermore, economic growth requires savings 
and investments, which implies that consumption needs to be 
curbed. But in a democracy, politicians having to seek periodic re-
election will encourage consumption and promote welfare, in other 
words achieving short-term, populist aims takes precedence over 
the longer-term ones of economic development.  
 
Of course, many of the theorists who support this line of 
argumentation do not claim that authoritarianism needs to become 
a permanent feature of developing societies. According to these, 
the purpose of authoritarianism is outworn once the state in 
question has successfully overcome the initial developmental 
hurdles. Critics of this approach, Sorensen points out, rightly claim 
that authoritarianism leads to arbitrary rule and that only 
democracy promotes a predictable environment in which 
economies can flourish. Political freedom is the handmaiden of 
development and without it citizens will not feel secure enough to 
consistently pursue economic goals.  
 
The argument that only an authoritarian state can promote 
development has been rubbished in the post-colonial experience of 
many countries and by the record of communist governments. 
Strong governments do not outperform market forces in the 
                                         
20 Sorensen Georg, Democracy and Democratisation, Westview Press, 1993 
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efficient allocation of economic resources although some 
government intervention is required to ensure a better distribution 
of wealth and to take care of market failures. That said, the notion 
that democracy automatically leads to development is also false. 
The case of India is instructive in this respect: for many years the 
world’s largest democratic state pursued a centrally planned 
economic development policy with rather dismal economic results. 
When India abandoned this path, it experienced phenomenal 
economic growth rates. Sorensen argues that China, led by an 
authoritarian government, was more successful at eradicating 
poverty than India, notwithstanding that post-Mao revelations to 
the effect that many millions of Chinese perished as a result of 
famine and misconceived policies such as “The Great Leap 
Forward” now place doubt on China’s comparative “success”. 
Indeed, the main argument is that Chinese authoritarianism had 
prevented the truth from becoming known and thus prevented or 
delayed corrective action from being taken by the Chinese 
authorities to deal with policy failures. By contrast India, as Sen 
points out, has not experienced serious famines since 
independence.  
 
The examples of India and China, flawed as they are and as 
qualified above, were employed by scholars to show that 
democracy does not automatically lead to economic growth and 
that some authoritarian governments can also be successful in 
achieving development. The conclusion drawn is perhaps correct in 
that it may be a mistake, at least logically, to claim that the class of 
all democracies is good and the class of all authoritarian 
governments is bad for development. Probably one has to 
distinguish as Sorensen does between types of democracies and 
types of authoritarianism because of their differentiated impact on 
development. However, it seems to be true that new revelations of 
what actually happened in China during the Maoist era have led to 
more than reasonable doubt as to veracity of its success in 
comparison to India’s. 
 
Sorensen denies that there can be a trade-off between democracy 
and development. Last but not least he emphasises that economic 
growth alone really tells us nothing about development. More 
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important is the distribution of welfare gains achieved. In this case 
democracies tend to be more successful at ensuring a fairer and a 
more equitable distribution of welfare.  
 
Economic Performance, Democracy and Human Rights 
 
In the light of the previous discussion a second question needs to be 
posed: in a situation of peace and ceteris paribus, would a 
democratic society experience a better rate of development than a 
state under authoritarian rule? Do democracy and human rights 
autonomously affect the rate of economic growth? Research has 
shown that the answer to this question is not clear. Common sense 
seems to dictate that democracy provides the good governance, 
stability and confidence required to encourage investment and 
growth. But in 1997, a study conducted by Jonathan Isham, Daniel 
Kaufmann and Lant Prichett led to the rather startling conclusion 
that there exists a strong and consistent link between the extent of 
civil liberties in a country and the performance of World Bank 
supported projects. But this performance did not appear to be 
affected by democracy.
20 The writers went on to conclude that, 
civil liberties are instrumental in increasing government efficacy 
and in reducing the incidence of corruption. Hence they lead to 
bigger economic growth rates. It is difficult however to accept how 
civil liberties and democracy could be dichotomised as was the 
case in this study. 
 
Insistence on “good governance”, democracy and human rights as a 
means to sustained economic growth has become increasingly 
popular since the fall of Communism. Of course international 
organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank often stop short 
of openly invoking human rights and democratic principles as 
being essential for economic growth lest they be accused of 
interfering in the internal affairs of states. Indeed, the conditions 
imposed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
                                         
20 Isham Jonathan, Kaufmann Daniel and Pritchett Lant, “Civil Liberties, 
Democracy and the performance of Government Projects”, World Bank 
Economic Review, Vol 11, pages 219-42. 
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on aid recipients with a dismal human rights and democracy record 
have been at the epicentre of controversy. Sergio Pereira Leite, the 
IMF’s Assistant Director in Europe, in a contribution to Le Monde 
observed that it is not the organization’s business to impose the 
‘human rights’ conditionality on the assistance it gives to its 
member states.
21 Moreover, by supporting sustainable growth and a 
stable macro economic environment, the IMF is also indirectly 
fostering human rights. While not being the IMF’s business, 
countries’ observance of human rights is scrutinised by 
international organisations established for that purpose. Leite also 
claimed that countries that display egregious disrespect for human 
rights find that the international community is unwilling to provide 
the financial resources necessary to make their adjustment 
programmes viable. And hence many countries voluntarily include 
human rights in their Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers.
22 He did 
however claim that the IMF supported a “rights-based” 
development strategy that includes among its ingredients, “active 
protection of civil and political liberties…broad participation in 
policy design.” Leite’s careful choice of words indicates that 
although International organisations are keen to avoid criticism of 
interfering in the internal affairs of countries by insisting on 
political reform, their increased insistence on “good governance” is 
often synonymous to a call for full scale democratic reform.  
 
Shifting the argument a little to the Arab world and the 
Mediterranean, the UNDP’s Arab Human Development Report 
2002 identifies a number of major deficits in the Arab countries 
and particularly the following: freedom, women’s empowerment 
and human capabilities/knowledge.
 23 The report points out that of 
the world’s seven regions, the Arab world had the lowest freedom 
score in the late 1990s. The report calls for concerted action 
towards political and democratic reforms as a means towards 
achieving development. Although the freedom deficit is not singled 
                                         
21 Le Monde, September 4, 2001. 
22 Leite Sergio Pereira, “Human Rights and the IMF”, Finance and Development, 
Vol. 38, 4, December 2001. 
23 Arab Human Development Report 2002, UNDP, New York, 2002 
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out as the only cause of underdevelopment, the report does not 
hesitate in describing it as the primary one. In the meantime, the 
European Commission (Com 2003 294 final) has summarised the 
main challenges emanating from the Euro-Mediterranean region as 
follows: 
 
-  Deficits in governance hamper the development of 
democratic values, and the promotion and protection of 
Human Rights; 
 
-  Marginalisation of women undermines political 
representation and hampers economic and social 
development; 
 
-  Implementation of international Human Rights conventions 
is poor; 
 
-  Legal and judicial systems lack sufficient independence; 
 
-  NGOs working in the civil and political spheres are weak, 
severely circumscribed in their action and cut off from 
international networking; 
 
-  Education, though relatively better funded than in many 
other developing countries, is unevenly dispensed, does not 
serve to overcome traditional discriminatory patterns and is 
ill adapted to the requirements of the modern economy; 
 
-  Authoritarianism and poor economic and social 
performance favour political marginalisation and provide 
fuel for radical movements and violence; 
 
-  Some political interpretations of Islam exploit cultural 
differences to question the universality of Human Rights. 
 
Up to the publication of the UNDP report, studies focusing on the 
Mediterranean have tended to be rather cautious in blaming the 
lack of democracy as one of the main factors for the region’s 
disappointing economic performance and for failing to attract 
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sufficient amounts of foreign direct investment (FDI), which is a 
strong propellant of economic growth. Among the developing 
countries, the Mediterranean region (though there are differences 
among the countries of the group) is the worse performer in the 
attraction of FDI. The FEMISE network blames bureaucracy for 
this, and possibly political instability.
24  Other negative factors 
mentioned include half-hearted privatisation programmes, the level 
of corruption, a legal framework that does not adequately protect 
property rights, lack of financial institutions in some countries, a 
reluctance to apply the law, as well as a shortage of skills. The 
political instability often cited refers both to the Middle East 
problem as well as the internal situation in some of the southern 
rim countries. A recent study has concluded, on the basis of 
empirical evidence, that democratic governments attract higher 
levels of FDI because such governments are associated with lower 
country risks for investors. It was estimated that democratic 
regimes attract as much as 70 per cent more FDI as a percentage of 
GDP than do authoritarian regimes.
 25 The study just quoted as well 
as its findings should instigate further research in the problems of 
the region and the questions it poses. 
 
Concluding Section 
 
Increasingly in the 1990s, the 1998 Nobel Price winner Amartya 
Kumar Sen,
26 has focused on the link between democracy and 
development. Some of his main ideas on the subject are being 
reproduced here at some length since they not only hold the answer 
                                         
24 “The Impact of EU Enlargement on the Mediterranean Partners”, FEMISE 
contribution to the 7
th Annual Meeting of Experts on Economic Transition, 23-24 
April, 2003. 
25 Jensen Nathan M., “Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: 
Political Regimes and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment”, International 
Organization, Vol. 57, 3, pages 587-616. 
26 Sen Amartya Kumar, “Democracy as a Universal Value”, Journal of 
Democracy 10:3, 1999 Carnegie National Endowment for Democracy and the 
Johns Hopkins University Press. 
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to many of the questions raised in the Democracy-Development 
debate developed above, but they also throw light on points for 
possible further research. Sen claims that: 
 
“…among the great variety of developments that have 
occurred in the twentieth century, I did not, ultimately, 
have any difficulty in choosing one as the pre-eminent 
development of the period: the rise of democracy. 
 
… Throughout the nineteenth century, theorists of 
democracy found it quite natural to discuss whether one 
country or another was "fit for democracy." This 
thinking changed only in the twentieth century, with the 
recognition that the question itself was wrong: A 
country does not have to be deemed fit for democracy; 
rather, it has to become fit through democracy.  
 
It is often claimed that nondemocratic systems are 
better at bringing about economic development. This 
belief sometimes goes by the name of "the Lee 
hypothesis," due to its advocacy by Lee Kuan Yew, the 
leader and former president of Singapore. He is 
certainly right that some disciplinarian states (such as 
South Korea, his own Singapore, and post-reform 
China) have had faster rates of economic growth than 
many less authoritarian ones (including India, Jamaica, 
and Costa Rica). The "Lee hypothesis," however, is 
based on sporadic empiricism, drawing on very 
selective and limited information, rather than on any 
general statistical testing over the wide-ranging data 
that are available. A general relation of this kind cannot 
be established on the basis of very selective evidence. 
For example, we cannot really take the high economic 
growth of Singapore or China as "definitive proof" that 
authoritarianism does better in promoting economic 
growth, any more than we can draw the opposite 
conclusion from the fact that Botswana, the country 
with the best record of economic growth in Africa, 
indeed with one of the finest records of economic 
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growth in the whole world, has been an oasis of 
democracy on that continent over the decades. We need 
more systematic empirical studies to sort out the claims 
and counterclaims.” 
 
Sen accepts democracy as a universal value and that there are no 
‘cultural’ impediments which prevent certain regions from being 
democratic (e.g Islam). He argues that when one examines the 
connection between political and civil rights, on the one hand, and 
the prevention of major economic disasters, on the other, it 
becomes evident that political and civil rights give people the 
opportunity to draw attention forcefully to general needs and to 
demand appropriate public action. Indeed according to Sen, the 
response of a government to the acute suffering of its people often 
depends on the pressure that is put on it. The exercise of political 
rights (such as voting, criticizing, protesting, and the like) can 
make a real difference to the political incentives that operate on 
government. He concluded by drawing attention to another 
significant point: 
 
“I have discussed elsewhere the remarkable fact that, in 
the terrible history of famines in the world, no 
substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent 
and democratic country with a relatively free press. We 
cannot find exceptions to this rule, no matter where we 
look…” 
 
He continued by showing that historically it can be shown that it is 
in countries under authoritarian rule that governments have been 
unable to correct economic policies in time when these were 
harming their own citizens. Furthermore, democracy helps a 
country develop its values which are important for spurring on 
development. Indeed, Sen claims, “Democracy is not a luxury that 
can await the arrival of general prosperity.” 
 
Some of the arguments developed by Sen, are equally applicable to 
the situation in the Mediterranean region. This region has been 
characterised as a zone of instability with a varied list of troubles - 
sub-regional conflicts that affect the region as a whole, terrorism, 
  122 
demographic pressures, unemployment, illegal immigration and a 
human rights and democracy deficit. Historic experience has shown 
that military power alone cannot resolve the conflicts. However, if 
Sen’s prognosis is correct, democracy can lead to more responsible 
governments - which is what is needed to encourage more 
economic growth. 
 
In recent years many of the countries of the Mediterranean region 
have embarked upon a process of economic reform that has led to 
their economies being opened up and further integrated into the 
global economy. But political reform has lagged behind all this and 
it appears that it has also fallen behind that of other regions of the 
world. Recalcitrant governments and opponents of democracy have 
often resorted to a multi-varied arsenal of objections to democracy 
including the non-universality of its principles, its “alien” 
“Western” foundations, its non-compatibility with Islam or cultural 
differences, that it increases chaos in times of transition when 
strong leadership is required and the fact that the time might not be 
ripe for it, certainly not before a higher level of economic 
development is achieved. On the contrary it has been argued here 
that the strengthening of human rights and democratic freedoms 
has a number of advantages for the Mediterranean region:  
 
1.  It enhances international peace and security in the region. 
2.  It provides a sounder basis for future economic growth. 
3.  It ensures that an all-encompassing development is 
achieved which improves the lives of most individuals and 
places the individual at the centre of economic life. 
 
At the same time, however, democratic reforms and the democratic 
peace should not be seen as a panacea for all the region’s troubles. 
While it is true that democracy erodes mutual suspicions and the 
insecurity that grows out of them, thus providing a framework for 
robust economic growth and a stronger basis for strengthening 
overall security in the region, a number of other challenges such as 
terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction may 
require additional means and action, as well as a prudential level of 
military preparedness. The spread of democracy and control over 
  123 
government actions by the people ensure that the use of such 
coercive means is capped at a lower acceptable level.  
 
Democracy and the rule of law are also essential for the building of 
a legal framework and mutual trust to help the process of south-
south economic integration. Just as the lack of transparency 
obstructs North-South economic relations in the region, it is 
difficult to see how this cannot also negatively influence the growth 
of south-south economic relations. 
 
Resistance to democratic reforms comes from various quarters as 
do the justifications for it. It is argued for example that with many 
of the governments of the southern rim facing strong internal 
challenges to their rule, an accelerated pace of political reform may 
be detrimental to everyone’s interests given that it will unravel the 
long standing structures that have held many of the Mediterranean 
societies together for more than three decades and throw the whole 
region into chaos. On the other hand the analysis in this paper 
shows that political reform which in effect closes the gap between 
rhetoric and reality by establishing democratic societies is essential 
for creating the conditions that lead to the realisation of that much 
desired but elusive economic growth, which is the cornerstone of 
development.  
 
The Commission’s proposals to deal with the human rights and 
democratic deficit in the Mediterranean region provide a good start 
but offer no guarantees that they will be achieved. The lack of 
methods with which to encourage recalcitrant states to reform is 
one problem; the other is the ambivalence and lack of unity 
between the EU institutions themselves which is often exploited by 
those who want to postpone political reform. There is yet another 
danger already referred to by many in the past and more recently by 
the UN Secretary General: the measures that are being adopted at 
the national level to combat terrorism, and which often and 
purposely are ambiguously phrased to give governments the widest 
possible powers, can also be used to undermine democratic control. 
What has been achieved so far may yet be swept aside by these 
changes. Has the counter-reformation in the Mediterranean 
commenced? The terrorist threat has boosted some transnational 
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alliances where none or perhaps even hostility existed in the past, 
positively instigating some closing of ranks. Following the 
Casablanca attacks of May 16
th, Algeria and Morocco strengthened 
their collaboration to combat terrorism. Positive as they may be, 
such initiatives can only remind us of the need to strengthen 
democratic safeguards to prevent a roll back of what has been 
achieved so far. 
 
Finally although a direct causal link has not been proved to exist 
between democracy and international peace and democracy and 
economic growth, all indicators discussed here seem to point to the 
fact that democracy does create the conditions which lead to both - 
peace and security as well as economic growth. This assertion is 
likely to remain controversial for some time. As argued here, just 
as democracy does not always lead to peace or economic growth, 
nor can it be claimed that authoritarianism necessarily produces 
conflict and economic stagnation. But the claim that democracy is 
more likely to lead to peace and development while 
authoritarianism is more likely to be associated with conflict and 
slow growth has been borne out by the arguments presented here. 
 
Finally, as argued in this paper, the Commission’s proposal to 
strengthen human rights and democratic freedom in the 
Mediterranean region is not only a welcome initiative, because as 
Sen would argue, these values are good in themselves, but also 
because the policy has both positive economic as well as positive 
political ramifications. 
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Annex 1 
 
European Commission Recommendations of May 2003  
on Democracy and Human Rights in the  
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
 
Recommendation N° 1 
 
The Union should ensure systematic inclusion of Human Rights 
and democracy issues in all dialogues taking place on an 
institutionalised basis: within the format of the Association 
Councils (Ministerial level) and Association Committees (Senior 
Official level) that monitor the implementation of the Agreements, 
and in other political dialogue formats such as the Troika. It should 
explore with partners the possibility of establishing technical sub-
groups to address issues related to Human Rights and 
democratisation. A better operational focus should be sought 
including co-operation on issues such as legal reforms and the legal 
frameworks governing the operation of NGOs and other Non-State 
actors. 
 
Recommendation N° 2 
 
In order to be able to develop and deepen a regular, in depth 
dialogue on Human Rights and democratisation, increased 
institutional knowledge and documentation on the situation and key 
issues in each partner country is needed. Commission Delegations 
in close co-ordination with Member States’ embassies should draw 
up an “état des lieux” in each country, on the basis of a standard 
grid of analysis, and provide regular updates through periodical 
reports. 
 
The analysis of the situation thus obtained should be systematically 
discussed between Heads of Missions, used to make an input into 
"EU Human Rights fact sheets" to be elaborated by HoMs and 
regularly revised in the relevant Council Working Groups. The 
conclusions reached therein should be translated into concrete 
proposals in the various formats of the dialogue, as outlined above. 
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The Commission will also systematically include Human Rights 
and democratisation in the dialogue conducted locally by its 
Delegations with Mediterranean partners. 
 
Recommendation N° 3 
 
The Commission should aim to ensure coherence and consistency 
inter alia through strengthening co-ordination between Commission 
Delegations and Member States' embassies. This should take the 
form in particular of: 
 
-  the convening of EU expert meetings at country level on the 
implementation of EIDHR and Human Rights related 
aspects of the MEDA programme; 
 
-  enhanced input into HoMs meetings on Human Rights and 
democracy issues; 
 
-  working to ensure a more active role in the implementation 
of UN Resolutions and recommendations in the area of 
Human Rights, including through appropriate follow-up by 
its Delegations of the recommendations made by UN treaty 
bodies and in connection with visits by UN Special 
Rapporteurs and Working Groups to the countries 
concerned. 
 
The Commission should also take a more proactive role in the 
initiation of discussion within geographic Council working groups 
on Human Rights issues, including when issues of a political nature 
arise which are linked to the implementation of co-operation in the 
area of Human Rights and democratisation. 
 
Recommendation N° 4 
 
At national level, the Commission Delegations should organise 
with Member States regular workshops with civil society, seeking 
as conditions allow a constructive involvement of national 
authorities. As much as possible, efforts should be made for this 
dialogue not to be limited to the national civil society but to reach 
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out to civil society organisations working at the regional level. The 
agenda would be discussed between Commission Delegations and 
Member States. 
 
These workshops would serve to: 
 
-  contribute to overall EU knowledge of local conditions, 
thus providing valuable input to the formulation of EU 
policy, including in the establishment of National and 
Regional Indicative Programmes; 
 
-  generate recommendations to assist with the programming 
of EIDHR and the identification of projects; 
 
-  contribute to structuring the debate at the regional level 
through the civil fora held in the framework of the 
Barcelona process; 
 
-  promote EU policies in the area of Human Rights, 
democratisation and rule of law including gender, as cross-
cutting issues; 
 
-  in addition, these meetings will help associations, 
foundations and NGOs working in the region to better 
structure and co-ordinate their work. 
 
Recommendation N° 5 
 
National Action Plans would serve three purposes: 
 
-  analysis of the context and situation particularly as regards 
legislation related to Human Rights and the identification of 
common overall objectives; 
 
-  drawing up a list of specific action points accompanied by 
measurable benchmarks of performance with clear 
timelines; 
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-  identification of the technical and financial assistance 
needed to achieve the objectives and specific targets. 
 
National Action Plans should be complementary and related to 
other economic and social development plans (eg under MEDA co-
operation) and could be financed through MEDA, supplemented as 
appropriate by other budget lines. These plans could serve to: 
 
-  analyse constitutional and other legal rights and propose 
reforms to legal and regulatory frameworks; 
 
-  support the implementation of Human Rights treaties to 
which each State is a party and promote the adherence to 
those international instruments to which the given State is 
not yet a party; support the development of national 
legislative frameworks, where necessary; 
 
-  Analyse the position and rights of women in their respective 
societies and propose how best to involve them in the 
development of their countries; 
 
-  support the development of appropriate legislative and 
administrative structures; 
 
-  support the integration of a national dialogue with civil 
society into national actions; 
 
-  promote the exchange of information on best practices and 
encourage their integration into national action; 
 
-  promote adoption and implementation of international 
standards and adherence to international instruments; 
 
As regards the status and activities of NGOs and other Non-State 
Actors, National Action Plans should: 
 
-  identify modifications to the legal or administrative 
frameworks necessary to implement international 
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commitments concerning the status and activities of NGOs 
and other NSAs ; 
 
-  strengthen the capacity of NGOs and other NSAs through 
practical training; 
 
-  promote networking between local and European NGOs 
and other NSAs; 
 
-  link local NGOs and other NSAs to international networks; 
 
- develop  co-ordination  amongst NGOs and international 
organisations. 
 
The Community would participate in the financing of those 
national or regional (see below) Action Plans that fulfil agreed 
minimum requirements. Since not every partner will be ready 
immediately to participate in such an exercise, in the short term the 
objectives will be to establish National Action Plans with, at first, 
two or three partner countries. As these plans are implemented, 
others can be drawn into the process. 
 
Recommendation N° 6 
 
Regional or sub-Regional Action Plans should be established 
whenever two or more partners want to develop further co-
operation on concrete activities linked to bilateral activities on 
Human Rights as indicated in the road map of the Valencia Action 
Plan. Such Action Plans could focus on issues addressed in future 
regional programmes under MEDA such as those on women's 
rights or co-operation in the field of justice. They should also 
provide a bridge to other multilateral activities, i.a., in the follow-
up to be given to the UNDP Arab Human Development Report. 
Regional Action Plans could also reinforce the scope for co-
operation with regional bodies like the Arab League. 
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Recommendation N° 7 
 
The elaboration of future National Indicative Programmes, 
beginning with the 2005-2006 exercise, will be used to further 
mainstream the promotion of good governance, Human Rights and 
democracy in the MEDA programme. In line with the Marseilles 
Communication referred to earlier, co-operation under MEDA 
should better reflect the progress of partner countries in the Human 
Rights and democratisation areas. Going beyond the specific 
support that may be mobilised for measures under the national or 
regional action plans, an additional substantial allocation will be set 
aside within MEDA to be made available to those partners who are 
working to develop and implement National Action Plans. It will 
be allocated within their NIPs to finance actions not necessarily 
directly related to Human Rights and democratisation. 
 
The Human Rights dimension of Country Strategy Papers will be 
further enhanced. In this work, due account will also be taken of 
the conclusions of the UNDP Arab Human Development Report 
2002, especially those regarding good governance and gender 
issues. 
 
Recommendation N° 8 
 
In the elaboration of the Regional Indicative Programme (RIP) for 
2005-6 the Commission will give full consideration to the ways in 
which to include support for the strengthening of Human Rights 
and democracy as well as the involvement of civil society. In 
addition, the Commission will prepare an evaluation of the impact 
of the various meetings of the Civil Forum which have taken place 
prior to Euro-Mediterranean meetings of Foreign Ministers; in that 
context it will consider ways in which the Civil Forum could 
develop a structure such that the outcomes of its meetings have a 
more operational impact on the activities of the partnership and the 
involvement of civil society in them. The RIP (2005-2006) will 
also take into account the conclusions of the 2002 UNDP Arab 
Human Development Report. 
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Recommendation N° 9 
 
The EIDHR’s strategy as regards the Mediterranean partners 
should be revised with a view to strengthening the capacity of civil 
society on a regional basis. This will be done through the creation 
or consolidation of regional networks of non-governmental 
operators that might include European NGOs. These strengthened, 
long-term networking and linkages will allow for exchanges of 
information and best practices as well as capacity building and will 
be based on concrete, result oriented activities in one or more of the 
following fields: 
 
-  freedom of association and expression (including 
monitoring/advocacy around legislative frameworks 
governing NGOs and other NSAs, Human Rights 
defenders); 
 
-  protection/advocacy on the rights of specific groups; 
 
-  good governance and the fight against corruption. 
 
In addition EIDHR post-2004 should pay particular attention to 
further enhancing the complementarity between EIDHR and 
MEDA programmes, particularly as regards the funding of 
activities that will be identified in the National Action Plans. 
 
Recommendation N° 10 
 
All the available instruments for election support (political 
dialogue, MEDA and EIDHR) should be used in a coherent and 
complementary manner to seek the improvement of the overall 
election framework through co-operation with both public 
authorities and civil society. The observation of elections should be 
considered when, given the specific situation, it has a real added 
value to offer. 
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Annex 2 
 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Human Rights 
 
The major objective of the creation within the Euro-Mediterranean 
region of “an area of dialogue, exchange and co-operation 
guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity requires a 
strengthening of democracy and respect for Human Rights, 
sustainable and balanced economic and social development, 
measures to combat poverty and promotion of greater 
understanding between cultures, which are all essential aspects of 
partnership”. 
 
The participants undertake to: 
 
-  act in accordance with the UN Charter and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights; 
 
-  develop the rule of law and democracy within their political 
systems; 
 
-  respect Human Rights and fundamental freedoms, including 
freedom of expression, association, thought, conscience and 
religion; 
 
-  give favourable consideration, through dialogue between 
the parties, to exchanges of information on matters relating 
to Human Rights, fundamental freedoms, racism and 
xenophobia; 
 
-  respect and ensure respect for diversity and pluralism in 
their societies and combat manifestations of intolerance, 
racism and xenophobia; 
 
-  The participants stress the importance of proper education 
in the matter of Human Rights and fundamental freedoms. 
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Under the social, cultural and human “chapter”, participants: 
 
- attach  particular  importance  to fundamental social rights, 
including the right to development; 
 
-  recognise the essential contribution civil society can make 
in the process of development of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership; 
 
-  will encourage actions of support for democratic institutions 
and for the strengthening of the rule of law and civil society 
[….]; 
 
-  undertake to guarantee protection of all the rights 
recognised under existing legislation of migrants legally 
resident in their respective territories; 
 
-  underline the importance of waging a determined campaign 
against racism, xenophobia and intolerance and agree to co-
operate to that end. 
 
Bilateral legal framework - Association Agreements 
 
The multilateral approach in the Barcelona Declaration has its 
counterpart in the bilateral approach to Human Rights and 
democratic principles expressed in the Association Agreements 
already concluded or in the process of being negotiated between the 
EU and its Member States on the one hand, and each of the 
Mediterranean partners on the other. 
 
Since 1992, the EC has included in all its agreements with third 
countries a clause defining respect for Human Rights and 
democracy as ‘essential elements’ in the relationship. 
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